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Within a single geographical area one hundred miles in radius
lies one of the most powerful production centers in the world. Almost
two-thirds of all steel entering world trade today is produced within a
basin containing parts of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands.1 Between World Wars I and II, steel producers in
this area were joined together in the International Steel Cartel.2 With
the adhesion of British and American steel producers to the working
rules of the International Steel Cartel in 1938, almost ninety-eight per
cent of world steel exports were regulated by restrictive production and
marketing arrangements.3
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Committee for International
Legal Studies of the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, for its grant
which enabled him to do the field research necessary for this Article. Additionally,
he wishes to acknowledge the gracious assistance and use of facilities extended by the
Rector and staff of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
t Member, State Bar of California.
1. Rieben, The Scope of the Common Market in Coal and Steel, 1956 Wo= AND
EuoPE SEmas 6, No. 1 (published and translated into English by the High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community). This monograph reprints material
that originally appeared in the Revue Economique et Sociale, July 1955 (Switzerland).
2. Lederer, La Sidrurgie europe'nne, et les cartels avant le plan Schuman,
Politique Etrang6re, Aug.-Dec. 1951, pp. 397-412 (France). See RIEBEN, DEs
ENTENTES DE MAiTRES DE FORGES Au PLAN ScHumAxN 181-309 (1954) (hereinafter
cited as Rum ).
3. Hxmm, INTERATIONAL CAIms 205-16 (1945). For general insight into
pre-war steel arrangements see his work THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CATEL passinm
(1943).
(1079)
1080 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
In contrast, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in 1951 has signalled an emancipation of the
trade of its members.4 Among France, Germany, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and Italy, considerable progress has been made
toward the establishment of a unified common market by the elimina-
tion of the following artificial impediments to trade: (1) customs duties
and quantitative restrictions on coal and iteel movements; ' (2) dis-
criminatory transport rates on the basis of nationality; ' (3) govern-
ment regulation of prices; 7 (4) government subsidies; 8 (5) price
discrimination for sales on the common market; 9 (6) cartels and agree-
ments in restraint of trade.'"
The entire thrust of the ECSC is toward economic expansion."
In the founding of the Community, a fundamental assumption was that
a general increase in the standard of living in the six member countries
could come only from an increase in production and productivity:
"The mission of the European Coal and Steel Community
is to contribute to the expansion of the economy, the development
of employment and the improvement of the standard of living in
the participating countries through the creation, in harmony with
the general economy of the member States, of a common market.
, 12
The restrictionist philosophy of the former cartels was discarded in no
uncertain terms by M. Jean Monnet, one of the principal architects and
promoters of the Community: "[T]here can be no Schuman plan that
will raise living standards if cartels are permitted." '-
4. During 1956 trade of steel commodities among the Member States of the
Community was running 140% ahead of similar exchanges in 1952: 5.1 million metric
tons against 2.1 million. Haute Autorit6, Bulletin Mensuel d'Information, April
1957, p. 5.
5. Article 4(a) of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity signed in Paris on April 18, 1951, and concluded (by art. 97) for a period
of fifty years from its entry into force. An authorized English translation has
been published by the High Authority and all references herein are to that document
(hereinafter cited as TAvTY).
6. Id. art. 4(b).
7. Id. arts. 4, 5, 67, 86.
8. Id. art. 4(c).
9. Id. arts. 4(b), 60.
10. Id. arts. 5, 58, 61, 65.
11. In presenting details of the Community's General Objectives, the High Au-
thority has stated that steel production capacity should rise to 73.5 million metric
tons by 1960 and to 86 million by 1965, while a figure of 105 million tons was fore-
cast for 1975 as a basis for estimating coal and coke needs. Bulletin From the
European Community for Coal and Steel, April-May 1957, No. 23, p. 10 (herein-
after cited as Bulletin). This periodical is published in English by the Washington,
D.C. office of the Information Service of the High Authority.
12. TpmATY art. 2.
13. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1951, p. 8, col. 3.
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The two principal means for the promotion of the ECSC's eco-
nomic growth are the common market and the common institutions.4
The common market is intended to promote a rational system of pro-
duction and distribution by establishing and promoting normal condi-
tions of competition. 6 In three stages, beginning with coal, iron ore,
and scrap on February 10, 1953, steel on May 1, 1953, and special
steels on August 1, 1954, the common market came into being. 6
It is the task of the common institutions-the High Authority,
17
the Common Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Court of
Justice-to insure that this Community lives up to the expectations
of the ECSC Treaty,'" for, unlike other attempts at European integra-
tion, the ECSC approaches integration from a realistic, matter-of-fact
basis. 9  It is no mere society to promote trade liberalization. In the
High Authority it has established a centralized body with truly executive
powers; 20 it can make decisions that are directly binding on individual
firms within the Member States without prior reference to the govern-
ments concerned."' High Authority decisions can be enforced by fines
and other sanctions.2 Its operations are financed by a levy on ECSC
firms.' Clearly, there has been a delegation of sovereignty by the Mem-
14. TEATvY art. 1.
15. Id. arts. 2-5. At the outset, the reader must understand the distinction between
the com mo market and the export market. The former refers exclusively to sales
to consumers within the national boundaries of the Member States. All other sales
are export market sales, or sales to "third countries," i.e., non-member States. The
Treaty clearly distinguishes between these two markets. For example, price lists
and conditions of sale for common market sales must be published by all coal and
steel producers. They need not publish their export sale schedules. TRvA art. 60.
16. Bulletin, Oct. 1954, No. 1, p. 4. When the Treaty was negotiated it was
realized that the creation of an expanded market comprising six previous national
markets would lead to serious economic and social disturbances in those industries
that had for some time enjoyed the fruits of governmental subsidies, protective tariffs
and other artificial advantages prohibited by the Treaty. The Belgian collieries in
particular faced the strong possibility of being closed out en masse. The newly
inaugurated Italian steel industry was in much the same position. Accordingly, a
transitional period of five years, ending in February 1958, was adopted during which
time the designated industries would be allowed special privileges and financial
assistance and be expected to adapt themselves to the rigors of a competitive market.
Thus, rather than demanding an unrealistic and abrupt change in these industries,
time for a gradual transition was allowed. However, these concessions were only for
the prescribed period of five years after which time the industries were to be on their
own. See Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions, TATY.v 101-30.
17. To advise the High Authority there is a Consultative Committee composed
of fifty-one members which includes seventeen representatives of producers, consumers,
merchants and workers. See TREATY arts. 18, 19, 58-62.
18. For a description and analysis of the legal structure of the organs of the Com-
munity together with an excellent legal examination of the Treaty as a whole, see
Bebr, The European Coal and Steel Comiunity: A Political and Legal Innovation,
63 YA.E LJ. 1 (1953).
19. See The European Coal and Steel Comiunmity, 21 PLANNING 225 (1955).
20. Id. at 226.
21. TREATY arts. 14, 15.
22. See, e.g., id. arts. 47, 64-66.
23. Id. arts. 49-53.
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ber States in a significant area of their national economy to a supra-
national authority."'
Viewed against this background, the Brussels Entente 2 5 assumes
a highly significant and disturbing position. Aptly described as a
"European Steel Cartel: Reduced Model," ' the Entente has manifested
the characteristics of the classic form of market regulation by producer
interests, and would seem to have constituted itself heir to the pre-war
International Steel Cartel.27  It is, in fact, what must be considered
the product of a rather natural attempt on the part of European steel
producers to inject a measure of stability into the world steel market.
But while the form is old, the context, as represented by the European
Coal and Steel Community, is new. The Entente, by conducting itself
in the export market in a manner categorically forbidden in the common
market, raises serious questions of the compatibility of two institutions,
one oriented toward control by combination, at least as to export trade,
the other dedicated to the maintenance of a free competitive common
market within the international community.
In this Article an attempt will be made to examine the origins,
character, and operations of the Brussels Entente, from its inception in
1953 until the end of 1956, when "boom" conditions still prevailed on
the world steel market. The legal status of the Entente, in relation to
the Treaty of the ECSC, will also be investigated. In addition, some
attention will be paid to the actions and deliberations of the various
common institutions of the Community as well as bodies outside the
24. For a description and examination of the powers granted ECSC organs to
interfere in the affairs of Member States, see MASoN, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
CoMMuNITY 54-74 (1955).
25. It should be emphasized that the Entente is a private producers' organization.
It is neither an agency of the ECSC nor sponsored by it in any way.
26. RmEr 479.
27. As has been pointed out elsewhere, a great deal of confusion exists concerning
the meaning of the term cartel, and necessarily this shortcoming must be reflected
in any discussion of international restrictive trade practices. HExNER, INTERNATIONAL
CARIms 35-42, 170 (1945). Hexner defines a cartel as a "voluntary, potentially
impermanent business relationship among a number of independent, private entrepre-
neurs, which through co-ordinated markets significantly affects the market of a
commodity or service." Id. at 24. The Information Service of the High Authority
has defined a cartel in this manner: "Cartels are formed when separate companies
engaged in the same line of business agree to follow policies designed to limit or
eliminate competition." Bulletin, April 1955, No. 6, p. 2. One of the Belgian
signatories to the Protocol establishing the Brussels Entente, M. Pierre van der Rest,
head of the Comit6 de la Sidrurgie Belge, and former President of the Consultative
Committee has publicly protested against the Brussels Entente being considered as
a cartel. Van der Rest, La Sid~rurgie eurapemte dans le cadre du Plai Schuman,
Revue Economique et Sociale, July 1955, pp. 175, 192 (Switzerland). It may be re-
called that when the first model of the International Steel Cartel was constructed in
1926 an indignant author protested that it was not a cartel but merely an entente, or
understanding. NATTAN-LAmRR, LA PRoDUc0ION SIDP-RURGIE DE L'EUROPE CON-
TINENTALE Er L'ENTExTE INTERNATIONALE DE L'AcIEmR 301 (1929).
Because of these verbal difficulties, the author is not interested in establishing
that the Brussels Entente does or does not come within any particular set of defini-
tions. Rather, this examination is confined to the character of the Entente and its
impact on the development of the European Coal and Steel Community.
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Community which have been concerned with the Entente. Finally,
some conclusions will be offered concerning the future relations between
the Entente, the Community, and "third countries," that is, countries
not members of the Community.
ORIGINS OF THE BRUSSELS ENTENTE
Objectives and Ambitions of the Entente
Both the ECSC and the Entente are products of a period marked
by a phenomenal rise in world steel productivity.28 This fact is par-
ticularly important for an insight into the factors which contributed to
the formation of the Entente. Even before the ECSC common market
for steel was opened in May 1953, steel producers' representatives had
concluded their first independent agreement to insure their freedom
from competition in export sales. Pursuant to negotiations in Paris
between the ninth and eighteenth of March 1953,29 representatives of
steel associations and works in Belgium, Luxembourg and France con-
cluded an agreement relative to the creation and maintenance of a
common export policy, the fixing of minimum prices and the establish-
ment of a central bureau in Brussels.3 Concluded for an indefinite
period, the arrangement was effective March 20, 1953. While German,
Italian and Dutch producers did not commit themselves to the arrange-
ment at that time, they were formally invited to join.3 1
The objectives of the Brussels Entente are neither novel nor
difficult to understand. Stated simply, its objectives are: (1) to reduce
"cut-throat" competition among Continental steel producers in export
sales to third countries; (2) to achieve a stabilization of prices on these
export markets.2
28. In 1937-38, world steel production amounted to some 106 million metric tons.
By 1948, notwithstanding the wide devastation resulting from World War I, it had
increased to 130 million tons. In 1956, world steel production amounted to 282 million
tons, or more than twice as much as 1948 production. See Steel in Western Europe,
1953 Rorrmn.EsAscHE BANK Q. REv. No. 3 (Netherlands); see also RimN 473-76;
Continental Iron & Steel Reports (The Hague), passinz (hereinafter cited as
CISR); The Metal Bulletin (London), passim (hereinafter cited as TMB); Le
Monde (Paris), April 13, 1957, p. 14, col. 2; N.Y. Times (Int'l ed.), Jan. 3, 1957,
p. 7, cols. 6-7.
Of world steel production, European producers in what is now the ECSC ac-
counted for 39.6 million metric tons in 1953. Bulletin, Oct. 1954, No. 1, p. 3. In
1956, they produced 56.7 million metric tons, amounting to approximately 20% of
world steel production. Bulletin, Feb.-March 1957, No. 22, p. 8.
29. CISR 7845-46 (March 27, 1953); TMB, March 27, 1953, p. 9, col. 1.
30. The text of the agreement is Annex I to this Article, p. 1114 infra. (Cita-
tions to Annex hereinafter refer to author's annexes set out at pp. 1114-16 infra.)
31. Annex I, para. 7, p. 1114 infra.
32. Van der Rest, La Sid&urgie eeropienne dans le cadre du Plan Schuntin,
Revue Econonique et Sociale, July 1955, pp. 175, 192 (Switzerland); RIxBEN 477-78;
TMB, April 17, 1953, p. 24, col 2; id., May 15, 1953, p. 27, col. 2 (statement of Pierre
Ricard of the French Chambre Syndicale) ; id., Nov. 27, 1953, p. 13, col. 1 (statement
of Pierre van der Rest).
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The most comprehensive attempt to understand and explain such
an instrument as the Brussels Entente is provided by a recent study of
the causes and evolution of international steel agreements.3 3  In his
study, Henri Rieben lays stress on the extreme sensitivity of regional
European steel producers to the fluctuations of the export market and
the corresponding urge to regulate the nature of the necessary adjust-
ments. The relative economic position of the members of the Brussels
Entente is strikingly similar to that of the members of the 1926 version
of the International Steel Cartel. For while they represent substantially
less than a half of world steel production, they nonetheless supply ap-
proximately sixty-five per cent of the world's total volume of steel
exports.8 4 It is reliably estimated that approximately twenty to twenty-
five per cent of the steel production of the Community is normally
exported to third countries.3 It is Rieben's central point that "under
the Schuman Plan as under the International Steel Cartel, the main-
tenance and development of exports constitutes for Europe a vital
necessity." " He cites as a consideration of long-run significance the
accelerated development of steel-producing capacity in countries that
were formerly importers of steel products, principally from Continental
producers.3 7 Another significant long-term concern to Continental pro-
ducers is the threat of increasing competition from the United States,
particularly in Latin America and in Asia." Short-term factors can
readily be appreciated from the economic circumstances in 1953-1954
attending the creation of the Entente: namely, a woefully sagging
market, with British exporters making a strong bid in markets outside
the Community. 9
33. RnmwN.
34. Id. at 473. See also Steel in Western Europe, 1953 RormDAmSCHE BANK
Q. REV. No. 3 (Netherlands); HIGH AUTHORITY, THIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE
AcrxmY OF THE COmmuNrrY 68 (1955) ; HIGH AUTHORITY, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE AcTrwY OF THE COMMUNITY 59 (1956) ; Haute Autorit6, Bulletin Mensuel
d'Information, April 1957, p. 5.
35. RIEBEN 473. The United Kingdom exports approximately 15% of her steel
production and the United States exports approximately 5%, primarily flat products.
Ibid.
36. Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)
37. Id. at 475-76. Rieben points out that the aggregate steel production capacity
of Australia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Egypt, South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
has more than doubled from 1939 to 1953 increasing from 2.8 to 6.6 million metric tons.
38. Ibid.
39. Through the last months of 1953, the domestic and export markets of United
Kingdom reflected a confident tone described as the "crest of a wave." TMB, Nov.
24, 1953, p. 17, col. 3. However, by January 1954, British producers were also facing
export difficulties. TMB, Jan. 12, 1954, pp. 8-9. It was even reported that "Con-
ceivably Britain might be prepared to join in export marketing and price arrangements,
but if so it is to be hoped that all parties will observe such arrangements closely;
in the past, certain foreign producers were, to put it mildly, somewhat careless in
keeping to their contractual arrangements." Id. at p. 9, col. 1. (Emphasis in original.)
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Organization: Phase One
At its inception, the Entente consisted of two principal organs.
1. The General Commission. Composed of two members from
each participating country given mandates by their respective producer
associations, this Commission was to establish general export policy
and fix the minimum prices and conditions of payment. In addition,
it was to act in a judicial capacity when violations of export policy were
proven.4°
2. The Permanent Bureau. With offices in Brussels, this body was
to provide administrative and fact-gathering assistance to the General
Commission. Every three days, steel associations of the members were
to inform the Permanent Bureau of the detail of all orders received by
member works, or on their account, with a complete listing of all ton-
nages, products, destinations, prices, and conditions of sale.4 ' In addi-
tion, any complaints concerning violations of export policy by member
works were to be reported to the Permanent Bureau. If probable cause
were shown the Bureau would order an investigation to be made by the
governing board of the national steel association whose member was
accused of wrongdoing. Upon proof of violation, the matter would be
submitted to the General Commission for action.42
It should be noted that the scope of the agreement was carefully
framed. It concerns only the export market and not sales on the com-
mon market. Secondly, it is worthy of mention that nowhere in the
first agreement was there any specification of penalties."
Although the General Commission was authorized to spell out a
complete export policy, the thrust of the agreement, as it then stood,
concerned only the establishment and observance of the fixed minimum
prices for the products covered by the agreement.4 There was no
explicit mention of tonnage quotas among the members nor any ref-
erence to a system of geographical division and assignment of export
markets. However, the early pattern of prices of the Entente indicates
an initial predisposition to impose a system of geographical price dis-
crimination. For example, in 1953 three price areas were ordained:
(1) The United States and Canada (generally assigned the lowest
40. Annex I, para. 1, p. 1114 infra.
41. Annex I, para. 2, p. 1114 infra.
42. Annex I, para. 3, p. 1114 infra.
43. Annex I, passim, p. 1114 infra.
44. See Annex I, para. 6, p. 1114 infra, for list of steel products subject to regula-
tion by the Entente.
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prices) ; (2) Latin America (the highest prices) ; (3) all other destina-
tions (prices somewhere in between)."
As was observed at the time, just prior to the signing of the agree-
ment, all bookings of new export deals were suspended for a forty-eight
hour period in the member countries.4" One of the obvious purposes
for this was to inform buyers of the new regime and possibly impress
them with the desirability of placing new orders before higher prices
went into effect. At the outset, however, doubts were expressed that
the Entente as then constituted could long survive, let alone achieve its
purpose. The discipline of member producers to abide by the minimum
prices established was seriously questioned. Indeed, even during the
forty-eight hour "sales holiday" observers had already detected some
irregularities.
4 7
Within three weeks from the effective date of the agreement, the
first price increases were announced by the Entente.48 Still the market
remained dull. As might have been expected, the fixing of a common
export price caused some consternation in the third countries affected.49
Yet within a month after Germany acceded to the agreement, she was
echoing the cries of her industrialists that the agreement was a failure
because it had no teeth.50
During the summer months, the pressure on the fixed prices in-
creased. With the reduction of export quotations by the British Iron
and Steel Federation, members of the Entente began to see the necessity
for some price reductions themselves."' A sagging market was still in
prospect. Belgian and Luxembourg groups had already announced
their decision to reduce daily production. 52 Instances of underquoting
official minimum prices appeared no longer as isolated cases but as
part of a widespread pattern.' Members of the Entente were forced
to recognize that if the Entente was to hang together it would have to
heed the overriding laws of supply and demand." It was simply im-
45. See, e.g., CISR 7856, 7860-61 (April 9, 1953).
46. Id. at 7838, 7845-46 (March 27, 1953).
47. Id. at 7845.
48. Id. at 7860-61 (April 9, 1953).
49. Id. at 7872-73 (April 18, 1953).
50. Industriekurier (Dusseldorf), May 30, 1953, p. 11, col. 2. Unconfirmt re-
ports indicate that German steel producers formally acceded to the Entente during
May 1953. Interview in Luxembourg, March 27, 1957. Italian producers are said
to have joined in June 1955. Interview in Brussels, March 19, 1957.
51. CISR 7997-98 (July 27, 1953).
52. Id. at 8024-25 (Aug. 8, 1953).
53. Id. at 8037-38 (Aug. 18, 1953).
54. During this time the policy of the Entente was one of determined resistance
to a price reduction, notwithstanding a reliable report that its minimum prices were
too high compared with those of competitors. See CISR 8024-25 (Aug. 8, 1953).
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possible to hold the line on prices by consent. Sanctions would be the
only way to enforce discipline. Accordingly, in September 1953, a
meeting in Luxembourg of producers' representatives from every coun-
try in the Community resulted in the Entente's entering a new phase.
Organization: Phase Two
Since most of the complaints concerned the persistent underquoting
of minimum prices by member works and non-member dealers, most of
the reform was devoted to this problem. The organization of the
Entente was changed in several significant respects. First, an inde-
pendent Control Commission was established to investigate all com-
plaints of policy violations by member works.5 This body replaced
the rather inefficient machinery of the earlier agreement whereby the
national steel federation whose member was complained of did the in-
vestigating. Second, a formal distinction was made between the fixing
of minimum prices, conditions of payment, etc., and the establishment
of general export policy. The former assignment was given to a Com-
mercial Commission consisting of two members from each of the mem-
ber associations. In practice these men were generally sales managers
or sales specialists of the larger works or steel associations. 6 Over-all,
general policy was established by a Committee of Presidents consisting
of one member from each signatory group. This body again was re-
sponsible for final action upon proof of any violation of Entente prices
or policy.
7
Perhaps most significant in the evolution of the Entente was its
new authority to impose penalties of up to $50 per ton by simple
majority vote of the Committee of Presidents for any violation of the
agreement reported by the Control Commission."8 The Fiduciaire
Suisse, which had performed a similar service for the International Steel
Cartel before World War II, was selected by common consent to fill
the role of the Control Commission. 9 Of hardly less significance is the
fact that when steel producers' representatives of Germany, France, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg signed 6 ' the agreement on
September 7, 1953, almost two-thirds of the world steel exports became
subject to the regulations of the Brussels Entente.
The heart of the agreement consists of the obligation undertaken
by the management of each steel works, or authorized steel association
55. Annex III, para. 3, p. 1115 infra.
56. Annex III, para. 1, p. 1114 infra.
57. Annex IV, preamble and paras. 4, 5, pp. 1115-16 infra.
58. Annex IV, para. 4, p. 1116 infra.
59. CISR 8068-69 (Sept. 19, 1953); RmBaEN 477.
60. Annex III, pp. 1115-16 infra.
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representative on behalf of all member works, to: (1) respect minimum
prices and other conditions of sale established by the Entente; (2)
impose identical conditions on their agents, representatives and inde-
pendent dealers with whom they dealt; (3) not contract to supply steel
for a longer period than allowed by the Entente; (4) not permit their
representatives or dealers with whom they do business to reduce their
commissions; (5) assume individual responsibility for any infractions
by their agents or dealers with whom they do business."
In addition the following obligations were assumed: (1) to par-
ticipate in any collective boycott of any independent dealer who violates
the terms imposed on him by the works party to this agreement; 62 (2)
to produce on request of the Control Commission any and all originals
of documents relating to sales allegedly made in violation of Entente
policy by the works, its agents or dealers with whom they do business.
(Refusal to do so constitutes proof of a violation.) " (3) to comply with
any requests or instructions transmitted to the signatory by the Control
Commission in connection with its work and to cooperate in any in-
vestigations deemed necessary by that body.'
Organization: Phase Three
The early months of 1954 brought no encouragement.' Notwith-
standing the strengthening of Entente machinery, the steel export
market as well as the common market of the Community continued to
decline. As a consequence, clandestine underquoting of official mini-
mum prices continued." Although this underquoting was quite wide-
spread, the conduct of the German producers infuriated the other mem-
bers. It is reported that in January, 1954 Germany was able to almost
double her export orders over the level achieved in the last nine months
of 1953. It was admitted that this could only be done by major price
concessions. Following a meeting in Brussels in early March, German
producers sought to make amends by "voluntarily" restricting their
export bookings for the month of March to twenty to twenty-five per
cent of their monthly average during the preceding six months.6 7 That
this was not a gesture of magnanimity will be indicated infra. s Later
that month the Entente entered phase three with the imposition of
export quotas, on a tonnage basis, for member steel associations.
61. Annex IV, para. 1, p. 1115 infra.
62. Ibid.
63. Id. at para. 2, p. 1116 infra.
64. Id. at para. 3, p. 1116 infra.
65. CISR 8253-54 (Feb. 22, 1954) ; TMB, Feb. 19, 1954, p. 23, col. 2.
66. CISR 8259-60 (Feb. 22, 1954) ; id. at 8640-43 (Dec. 18, 1954). See also id.
at 8229-30 (Jan. 30, 1954).
67. Id. at 8276 (March 4, 1954); TMB, March 5, 1954, p. 24, col. 1.
68. See text at note 153 infra.
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It is reliably reported that even at the September 1953 meeting,
some members of the Entente favored the imposition of tonnage export
quotas. 9 However, because of an inability to agree on specific arrange-
ments, no decision was made at that time other than to instruct the
Commercial Commission to continue its investigation of the matter.7"
After numerous discussions, the Commercial Commission committed
itself to the imposition of mandatory export quotas at its meeting of
March 23, 1954.7'
Not all the representatives were enthusiastic about the imposition
of export tonnage quotas, some preferring other arrangements. For
example, one of the reported proposals was to inaugurate a kind of
export comptoir in which all export orders would be centralized and
subsequently pooled for transfer to works on a priority basis, depending
on relative need for the business.72 The ultimate plan, however, as
agreed upon by the Committee of Presidents, was to establish an over-all
tonnage quota for exports fixed at 325,000-400,000 tons per month for
the Entente as a whole.7 Each of the national steel associations was
in turn allotted a percentage quota of this overall tonnage. The initial
basis for the determination of these percentages was to be the period
of sales by the respective member associations during the fifteen months
between October 1, 1952 and December 31, 1953. 74 However, the
French and Luxembourg producers insisted upon the first nine months
of 1953 as the reference period, and this was ultimately adopted.75 In
early April the export quotas of the member groups were established :76
Belgium-Luxembourg 56.7%o
France 24.0%
Germany 16.3%
Holland 3.0%o
69. CISR 8068-69 (Sept. 19, 1953) ; TMB, Sept. 25, 1953, p. 21, col. 2.
70. TMB, Sept. 25, 1953, p. 21, col. 2. In CISR 8073 (Sept. 29, 1953) it was
stated: "The question of eventual export quotas has also been discussed, but no con-
crete arrangements have been made yet. Whether such measures will be laid down
in the future depends on coming developments of the market and the economic situ-
ation. Agreements on export prices and export quotas would in any case mean an
export cartel similar to the International Iron and Steel Combine of pre-war years."
71. Proces-verbal of meeting of L'Entente de Bruxelles on March 23, 1954, pre-
pared by the Groupement des Hauts-Fourneaux et Acieries Belges, signed and
circ,,lated by M. Wattillon, Directeur, Division Commerciale. The proceedings con-
cerning sales policy and price control are described at pp. 2-5. See also TMB, March
26, 1954, p. 25, col. 1.
72. See, e.g., CISR 8287 (March 4, 1954).
73. CISR 8302-03 (March 26, 1954); TMB, March 26, 1954, pp. 25-26.
74. Ibid.
75. TMB, April 9, 1954, p. 26, col. 1.
76. CISR 8321-22 (April 6, 1954); TMB, April 9, 1954, p. 26, col. 1. Contem-
poraneously, M. Pierre Ricard of the French Chambre Syndicale indicated the
desirability of an "export agreement" between Continental and British steel producers.
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It was not intended, however, that these quotas remain immutable.
Indeed, the meetings of the Entente during this period, as might be ex-
pected, were marked with bitterness, recriminations and suspicion.77
German producers made it quite clear that they were by no means recon-
ciled to a permanent quota of 16.3 per cent, particularly since their quota
in the former International Steel Cartel was 38 per cent.78  Notwith-
standing that a firmer tone was detected on the market, the quota system
as tentatively agreed upon was extended for another month until the
end of May. 9 By the end of May the market had so dramatically im-
proved that the Entente announced modest price increases for certain
products.' Meeting again on July 13, the Entente announced fresh
price increases 81 as new orders for steel began to reach peak levels. By
November 1954, it was almost impossible to place orders on the export
market for less than ten per cent above the minimum prices of the
Entente.82 Before the close of the year, most of the Belgian mills that
just a few months before were considering "emergency" measures were
operating at full capacity." This "boom" 84 continued until the end
of 1956, the period under study.
ATTITUDE OF THE COMMON INSTITUTIONS OF ECSC
The institutional structure of the ECSC is basically a tripartite one
in which the High Authority functions as the executive, the Common
Assembly as the legislative, and the Court of Justice as the judicial
branch. In addition the High Authority has an advisory adjunct, the
Consultative Committee, which is composed of representatives of all
interested groups-producers, workers, consumers and distributors.
The Council of Ministers, a body made up of representatives of the
77. CISR 8337 (April 17, 1954).
78. Id. at 8350-51 (April 28, 1954).
79. TMB, May 7, 1954, p. 24, col. 2. Subsequently, it was reported that the
aggregate monthly export quota of the Entente was raised to 425,000 metric tons.
TMB, May 25, 1954, pp. 18-19.
80. Id., June 11, 1954, p. 19.
81. CISR 8456-58 (July 15, 1954).
82. Id. at 8591-92 (Nov. 3, 1954).
83. Id. at 8605-07 (Nov. 15, 1954). German plants were working at full capacity
with three shifts. Id. at 8616 (Nov. 26, 1954).
84. The boom beginning in mid-1954 was quite different in its origins than that
arising from the Korean War. In the first place, exports to third countries in the
autumn of 1954 remained stable, while in 1951 they exceeded the level of the pre-
ceding year by more than 40%. Secondly, a considerable rise in prices took place
ii 1951, in respect to both countries now members of the Community and third country
sales. During the 1954-55 period, price increases were noticeably more modest. No
small measure of this "steadiness" must be attributed to the stability fostered by the
operation of the unified common market of the ECSC. See CISR 8621-22 (Nov. 26,
1954) ; see also Steel Review: The British Iron & Steel Federation Q., April
1956, p. 21.
1958] THE BRUSSELS ENTENTE 1091
Member States, also consults with the High Authority on matters of
national economic policyY
The Common Assembly
Consisting of some seventy-eight representatives of Member States
of the Community, the Common Assembly's primary strength lies in
its power to focus public attention and criticism on the policies of the
Community. Moreover, by a two-thirds majority vote it can remove
the members of the executive, the High Authority, on a motion of
censure. 6 It may be said of the attitude and activity of the Common
Assembly toward the question of the Brussels Entente, that there has
been no great alarm regarding its possible deleterious effects on the
achievements of the Community." While two of its sub-groups have
at various times devoted some attention to the general problem of re-
strictive business practices in the steel sector both on the common market
and on the export market, no dangerous relationship between the Brus-
sels Entente and the operation of the common market has been seen
and the public records of the Assembly make no reference to any request
being directed to the High Authority to pursue the matter. Indeed, it
appears to be taken on faith since June 1953 that there has been no
danger because the High Authority had said so. Finally, it should
85. Bulletin, Oct. 1954, No. 1, pp. 4-6.
86. The powers, rights and role of the Common Assembly are set out in arts.
20-25, 38, 78, and 95 of the TaFxTy. For a description and analysis of its structuie
and operation see INSTITUTE DES RELAT ONS INTERNATIONALES, LA COMMUNAUTE
EUROPAENNE DU CHARBON Er DE L'AcER 59-66 (1953). See also MAsoN, THE
EuRoPEAx COAL AND STEEL Commu=mr 49-50 (1955). For a comprehensive history
of Community activity from 1952 to 1955, with an emphasis on the role of the As-
sembly, see LA CommUNAUTL EUROPfENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, ANNUAIRE-
MANUEL DE L'AssEMBLtE COMImUNE passim (1956).
87. While the Assembly has at several times heard addresses on subjects which
included references to the Brussels Entente, it has not felt the need, apparently, to
adopt any resolution regarding it specifically. On January 16, 1954, a resolution
was adopted relative to the investment policy of the High Authority. As a part
of that resolution the Assembly went on record: "The first objective of the policy
of investments of the Community must be the reduction of costs, particularly in the
steel industry. . . ." JouRNAL OFFiCiAL DE LA COmUmNAuTA EUROPENNE DU
CHARBON Er DE L'AcIER, 3e annie, No. 2, at 242-44 (1954).
A 1954 report of the Commission on the Common Market, a sub-group of the
Assembly, dealing with the steel sector noted a reduction in prices on the common
market, based on data supplied by the High Authority, and continued: "In the same
vein, one must remark that in the steel industry cartels have exercised an activity
whose influence on the market is incontestable. This problem was similarly before
the Commission at its meeting on November 13, 1953. In this regard, the High
Authority has responded that the industries in question have been for some thirty
years oriented, in a sense determined, be it by governments or by cartels. The
High Authority has declared that it has firmly resolved to persuade the enterprises
of the considerable advantages offered them by a free market. The High Authority
believes that the industries are in agreement with this general principle but that
it would have to embark upon an 'educational mission.' " RAPPoRT FAIT AU NOm
DE LA CoM-MIssIoN DU MARCHE COMMUN 14 (Doc. No. 13, Session Ordinaire,
M. H. A. Korthals, Rapporteur) (1954). The Report also reveals the strong
interest of the Commission in coal cartels, including coal export cartels. Id. at 21-27.
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be remembered that there still exists today in the ranks of the Common
Assembly, among men who are parliamentarians in their own countries
as well, a wide range of opinion about the desirability of restrictive trade
practices.
Attitude of the High Authority
Immediately after the opening of the common market for steel,
M. Jean Monnet, first President of the High Authority, reaffirmed the
determination of the High Authority to insure that the price of steel
remained truly free on the common market and that the prohibition of
the Treaty against marketing and price agreements by producers was
strictly observed."8
1. Phase One. The official attitude of the High Authority toward
the Brussels Entente was first expressed by Albert Coppe, Vice Pres-
ident of the High Authority, in June 1953. Stressing that he was
speaking quite deliberately to avoid all misunderstanding, he stated
before the Common Assembly that two distinct considerations would
determine the High Authority's attitude toward the Entente: (1) any
influence of the Entente on the common market, an inquiry based on
article 65 of the Treaty; (2) any influence on international trade and
the markets of third countries, an inquiry based on article 3 (f) of the
Treaty.
He then declared:
"[T] he High Authority has concluded that the export entente
which now exists does not tend, in the actual conditions of the
common market, as the agreement is known to the High Authority,
to prevent, restrain or distort the normal operation of competition
on the common market.
"The High Authority has not had, therefore, to intervene to
authorize it.
"I would like to state that in our opinion this agreement does
not place in danger the equitable limits of prices applied on the
external markets with which Article 3 is concerned and to which
I refer." 89
As a matter of policy, he stated, the High Authority has adopted
a doctrine of prudence and intended to intervene only when absolutely
necessary.90
88. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA COMMUNAUTL EUROP ;ENNE DU CIHARBON ET DE
L'AcIER, DEBATS DE L'AssEMBLfE COMMUNE, CoMPTE RENDU IN EXTENso DES
SEANcES, Sess. of June 19, 1953, No. 4, at 17.
89. Id. at 109-10. TREATY art. 3 provides: "Within the framework of their
respective powers and responsibilities and in the common interest, the institutions
of the Community shall: . . . (f) foster the development of international trade and
ensure that equitable limits are observed in prices charged foreign markets." The
relevant portion of article 65 is set out in note 133 infra.
90. Id. at 110.
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2. Phase Two. However, soon after the reformation of the Brus-
sels Entente in September 1953, the High Authority felt it could no
longer ignore the Entente. Early in November, the High Authority
announced that it was "bound to register the fact that steel prices have
been fixed, not by firms individually but by agreement between them
and under the auspices of national organizations to which they be-
long." 91 Already said to be under way was an investigation of "pro-
ducers' agreements-which might be price cartels-and concentrations
of industrial power which might act as monopolies." 9 Thus, for the
first time in the modern history of Continental industry, steel producers
were served direct notice that a public body was prepared to intervene
against the tried and true ways of price fixing and market conspiracy
to prevent the frustration of the stated objectives of the Community.
Addressing the Market Commission of the Common Assembly,
Vice-President Franz Etzel stated in confirmation that the High Au-
thority was actively conducting an investigation of the operations and
organization of steel producers' associations with an eye to their re-
organization or their dissolution, in conformity with the anti-cartel
provisions of the Treaty. He declared that the High Authority had
decided to ask the steel men to dissolve the export entente on their own
initiative without High Authority intervention. If this approach were
rejected, he stated that the High Authority was conscious of its re-
sponsibilities under article 61 (c) by which it was empowered to fix
minimum or maximum export prices.93
Attitude of the Consultative Committee
Accordingly, on November 20, 1953, the High Authority notified
the President of the Consultative Committee that it wished to consult
the Committee regarding the propriety of fixing minimum or maximum
prices for steel exports, as well as the levels to be so fixed. A special
commission of the Consultative Committee was convened to study these
questions on November 27, 1953. 9"
91. 1 NEWSLETTER OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNrrY-ScHUmAN
PLAN 3 (Luxembourg 1953).
92. Id. at 4.
93. HAUTE AuToRrr., RAPPORT MENsTEL, DOCUMENT DE TRAvAi. k L'USAGE
DES SERvicEs D9 A HAUTE AuToRrit, lre anne, No. 3, at I 1-I, 3 (1953). No
express mention was made of proposed action under any other provision of the
Treaty. Article 61(c) provides that the High Authority may fix minimum or
maximum export prices, adapted to the nature of the export market, if such action
can be effectively supervised. This may be done, however, only after a showing
of danger resulting from the state of the market or that international trade is
jeopardized by producers charging inequitable prices in foreign markets.
94. Rapport de la Commission Chargie d'Etudier l'Opportuniti de Fixer des
Prix Minima on Maxima pour les Produits d'Acier e r'Exportation vers les Pays
Tiers, ComTE CoNSULTATIF (Doc. No. 8355f, Proces-Verbal Doc. No. 8329f)
(1953).
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The report of the special commission was adopted by the Con-
sultative Committee the following week. 5 This report was prefaced
by the remarks of the spokesman of the steel producers participating in
the Brussels Entente:
"Taking account of the declarations made by certain rep-
resentatives of the member governments of the Community as well
as those of certain members of the High Authority,
"Taking account of assurances given the Luxembourg Parlia-
ment at the time of the Treaty ratification,
"Taking account, finally, of the provisions of the American
antitrust legislation that authorizes export ententes, the steel pro-
ducers have the conviction that the provisions of Article 65 provide
them with a complete freedom of action in exports to third coun-
tries and consequently the price agreement presently in effect is
perfectly legal." 96
The consultation requested by the High Authority was felt to pose
three essential questions: (1) the possibility of finding means adapted
to the nature of the external markets; (2) the possibility of establishing
an effective control; (3) the necessity of such measures. 97
To the first question the report replied that the inherent character
of the export markets requires a system capable of instantaneous adapta-
tion. The unanimous opinion of the Commission was that minimum
or maximum prices established by the High Authority cannot be
adapted to the realities of the export markets. On the other hand, the
private arrangement of the producers was preferable in that it was
supple and adaptable to market realities."8 Secondly, effective control
of its minimum prices could not be established by the High Authority.9
Thirdly, as to the necessity of such price-fixing the report concluded that
the export markets presented no more dangers to steel enterprises than
the common market. No abuses to international trade were apparent,
and the steel prices charged on the export markets were felt to be
equitable.'
There is no question that the High Authority was taken somewhat
aback by this action. The High Authority spokesman at the meeting
was constrained to ask whether the Commission preparing the report
95. Compte Rendu Analytique, Comn'- CONSuLTATIF, VIe Sess., at 6 (Doc.
No. 8445f) (edition revis~e 1953).
96. Rapport de la Comnission, supra note 94.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 3-4.
100. Id. at 4.
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really wanted to mark its opposition to price-fixing by the High Au-
thority in the case where article 65 might be applied. 1 ' He was assured
that the Commission was so disposed."0 2
Attitude of the Council of Ministers
Apparently undaunted, the High Authority proceeded to consult
the Council of Ministers. It would not be an exaggeration to state that
the consultation at the December 21, 1953 meeting of the Council of
Ministers proved an even greater fiasco for the High Authority. One
of the functionaries at the meeting termed it one of the most "fantastic"
that he had ever witnessed before or since. 3 The consultation opened
on the cheerless note of the President that the consultation would be
extremely difficult to conduct, if not precluded, because of the lack of
any documentation provided by the High Authority. 4 There is little
doubt that the representative of the High Authority was shocked by
this turn of events.' Subsequent developments did not aid his re-
covery.
In an effort to clarify his position, the High Authority spokesman
stated that the High Authority proposed to determine whether the ex-
port cartel was in accord with the Treaty, particularly article 65."'0 If
the High Authority concluded that the existence of the cartel was in
contradiction to the Treaty provisions, it would be its duty, in con-
formity with article 61 (c) to fix minimum prices and also maximum
prices for export. The question that the High Authority posed to the
Council was whether such price-fixing would be useful, and, if an
affirmative answer were given, what level should be fixed. Certainly
at that very moment prices were being fixed by the export entente.
Did the Council believe them to be equitable? '0'
The President of the Council appeared to state the consensus when
he closed debate on the subject in the following manner: In the light
of deficient documentation supplied by the High Authority the Council
did not believe it was in a position to be consulted. However, if despite
this view the High Authority believed that a consultation had taken
place, it would have to consider that the Council had unanimously given
101. Compte Rendu Analytiqzw, sipra note 95.
102. Ibid. To a suggestion that the High Authority dispatch a "voting repre-
sentative" to the meetings of the Brussels Entente, a stern rebuff was given by the
High Authority spokesman. Id. at 6.
103. Interview in Brussels, March 19, 1957.
104. Projet de Proces-Verbal de la 116me session du Conseil tente a Liuxembourg
le 21 decembre 1953, LE CONSEIL 39 (Doc. No. 35f/54).
105. His surprise is of record. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
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a negative response 108 to the questions directed to it by the High
Authority. 0 9
RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 110 is a
multilateral trade agreement signed in 1948 by every major trading
nation in the free world."' All the Member States of the Community
are also Contracting Parties to the GATT. In order to eliminate the
tariffs on coal and steel products within the Community it was neces-
108. Id. at 42-43. The Court of the ECSC has not to date been confronted with
any case involving the Brussels Entente.
109. One other development at this meeting deserves mention. One member
of the Council queried whether it would make any difference to the American
Government if minimum export prices were fixed by the Community rather
than by a cartel. Id. at 39. In fact the United States, although it has warmly
supported the ECSC from its inception, has expressed concern as to the kind of
competition it must face on world markets from Community steel producers.
In 1953 the State Department directed a series of notes to the governments of the
Member States of the Community regarding the possibility of friction developing be-
tween members of the Community and non-members over the activities of the
Brussels Entente. The United States made reference to reports of activities of the
Entente which it was feared would tend to increase steel import costs in third
countries. Attention was directed to possible violations of international agreements.
Because no Community action was contemplated, the United States took the position
that it was the responsibility of the individual governments to terminate the Entente,
especially in view of foreign aid agreements between this country and European
recipients.
The responses to the American note were essentially negative. Most of the
Member States indicated an unwillingness to take any action against the Entente.
Although the United States has not contested these answers, it has been quite active
in pursuing the matter before such international organizations as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
110. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 STAT.
pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, as renewed, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2886. See Vernon,
America's Foreign Trade Policy and the GATT, in PRINCETON UNIV. ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 21 (1954); see also AmERicAr BAR AssOCIATIoN,
REPORT OF SUBComMITTEE To STUDY THE ORGANIZATION FOR TRADE COOPERATION
(1956).
111. It should be pointed out that the Community also "stands trial" before
other international organizations. Reference is made here to the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which like the GATT is dedicated
to trade liberalization and also granted the Community a waiver from its obliga-
tions in order to allow the common market to come into being. Decision of the
Council, OEEC Doe. No. C(53)9 (Feb. 7, 1953). It was before the Council of this
body that, in June 1954, Denmark made a complaint regarding the activities of
the Brussels Entente. Denmark was concerned lest the Entente become as the
International Steel Cartel before the second world war, solely concerned with the
level of steel producer's profits, regardless of the consequences to the rest of the
world. Intervention by the High Authority was urged and the OEEC Council
formally requested consultation with the High Authority. OEEC Doc. No.
C(54)243 (Aug. 3, 1954), Doc. No. C/M(54)25 (Sept. 24, 1954). As a result,
direct discussion between Denmark and the High Authority was held in Luxem-
bourg in February 1955, at which time the latter attempted to convince Denmark
that the export prices of the Community were being kept within reasonable limits.
Although Denmark maintained certain reservations regarding the High Author-
ity's conclusions, it decided not to pursue the matter unilaterally before the OEEC
and the GATT. HIGH AUTHORITY, THnu GENmuL REPORT ON THE AcTmrrs
OF THE CoMMuNrrY 30-31 (1955).
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sary for the Member States to be relieved of their obligation to extend
such relief to every other Contracting Party pursuant to the GATT.
Accordingly, the Member States of the Community were granted a
waiver from the most-favored-nation clauses of the GATT in November
1952 after lengthy negotiations." Under the terms of this waiver,
the Community is considered as a single territory insofar as coal and
steel trade are concerned and as such assumes most-favored-nation obli-
gations only in regard to non-member countries. The terms of the
waiver expressly provide that the Community is to "take account of
the interests of third countries both as consumers and as suppliers of
coal and steel products, to further the development of international
trade, and to ensure that equitable prices are charged by its producers
in markets outside the Community." :13 In addition, the Member States
were obligated to submit an annual report to the Contracting Parties
until February 1958 on the measures taken by them toward full applica-
tion of the ECSC Treaty.
1 4
The first annual report of the Member States of the Community
was submitted to the Contracting Parties to the GATT in September
1953 and discussed the following month at the GATT's eighth ses-
sion."' The Contracting Parties took note that "producers of the
Community applied different prices in different export markets and
that they had concluded cartel arrangements regarding export prices." 116
The High Authority, attending the sessions as an observer, replied that
differential prices for different export markets were fully consistent with
a competitive market. Further, the High Authority insisted that there
was no showing that export prices of the Community producers were
112. GATT Doc. No. 6/35 (Nov. 10, 1952) (hereinafter cited as GATT
WArvER). See GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SEcrE DOCUMENTS 17-22, 85-89
(Supp. 1953).
113. GATT WArvE. This language is substantially identical with that of
TREATY art. 3(f). See notes 89 stupra and 118 infra.
114. GATT WAvER. In the negotiations regarding the waiver, the Member
States of the Community stressed that the integrated economy of the Community
would result in an increase of trade potential for non-members of the Community.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that certain risks and uncertainties would
confront outsiders.
Thus, before the non-member states would agree to surrender some of their rights
under the GATT, they required definite assurances that the Community would follow
a liberal trade policy and that their vital interests be safeguarded. This concern
resulted in the provision of a Preamble to the GATT Decision in which the considera-
tions underlying the decision were expressed.
Each year a "Working Party" of the GATT ik convened to discuss and report
to the Contracting Parties upon the annual report of the Member States of the
Community to the GATT. See Report of Working Party, Adopted by the Contract-
ing Parties in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 85-89 (Supp.
1953).
115. GATT Doc. No. G156 (Oct. 23, 1953) in GATT, BAsIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SzrzcrED DocMNrrs 101-16 (Supp. 1954).
116. Id. at 106.
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inequitable in violation of the terms of the waiver granted the Com-
munity. If ever inequitable prices were charged, the observer stated
that the High Authority would be prompt and definitive to the full
extent of its power." 7
In subsequent sessions of the GATT there has been much debate
over the meaning of "equitable prices," a concept crucial to both the
waiver granted the Community by the GATT and to article 3(f) of
the ECSC Treaty."' The Danish representative was firmly of the
opinion that the only test of equitable prices was a comparison between
the prices charged by the same enterprises on the common market and
on the export market. This was his government's understanding when
it agreed to the terms of the waiver, he stated." 9
The High Authority observer insisted that Community export
prices were equitable. In his opinion, whether prices were equitable
should be determined primarily on the basis of comparison with the
export prices being applied by the producers of other leading countries,
such as Great Britain and the United States. 2 ' Comparison with prices
on the common market should be only a subsidiary test, he insisted.
The GATT was not prepared to deny the High Authority's view.
It noted, however, that:
"[T]he exports of the Community amounted to about 65% of
world exports, that on all steel markets the share of the Community
was larger than that of any competing country and that, in the
case of the West European steel market, the influence of the Com-
munity was predominant. When, as is the case at the present time,
the exporters of the Community adopt a common export price
policy, their influence on the formation of prices on export markets
is bound to be substantial, and it is suggested that the existence
of such price agreement should be taken into account when the
equitable character or otherwise of prices charged by Community
exporters is discussed." "'
Each year the Community has submitted documentation on prices
and price movements to support its contention that steel prices are
equitable. Countries such as Denmark and India have submitted data
117. Id. at 107-08.
118. Both provisions commit the Community to protect the interests of third
countries, article 3(f) of the Treaty requiring the Community to foster international
trade and "ensure that equitable limits are observed in prices charged in foreign
markets," and the fifth paragraph of the Preamble of the GATT WAIvER charging the
ECSC with the duty of ensuring that "equitable prices are charged by its producers
in markets outside the Community."
119. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 154 (Supp. 1955).
120. Id. at 155.
121. Ibid.
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to the contrary. In addition, the Secretariat of the GATT has sub-
mitted its analysis. 2 Still there has been no agreement on the manner
of determining "equitableness" and, consequently, there has been no
agreement as to whether ECSC steel export prices have been equitable.
In summary it may be said that although the Community has
never been censured or held in default of its international obligation
to protect the interests of non-member countries, the very existence
of a regularized procedure for review, by which the High Authority
is called upon to justify its actions or failure to act in the field of external
economic policy, operates as a reminder to the Member States of their
obligations to the world community.
LEGAL STATUS OF THE BRUSSELS ENTENTE
Since its first public statement on the question, the High Authority
has insisted that it has had no legal recourse against export cartels as
such. Regarding the Brussels Entente, the High Authority has
taken the view that so long as the Entente confines its operations to
the export market, it could not force the Entente to dissolve.' Only
when the Entente is shown to interfere with competition on the com-
mon market will the High Authority take action against the Entente.
Having found no such effect on the common market, the High Au-
thority, except for one instance, has mounted no offensive against the
Brussels Entente. 4 Certainly the High Authority's abundance of
caution and avoidance of dogma is not totally unwarranted." At the
same time, one hopes that its present position is not immutably fixed, for
122. See, e.g., Note by the Executive Secretary, GATT Doc. No. L/425 (Oct.
1955). In this memorandum the executive secretary made a comparison of Community
steel export and internal prices, and compared Community steel export prices with
those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Relative to the comparison
betveen Community export and internal prices he concluded that the customary
tendency for export prices to fluctuate more widely than domestic prices had continued
since the establishment of the Brussels Entente and maintenance of a common export
policy. However, the amplitude of fluctuations was seen as smaller than that of
earlier postwar years. While all export prices for all exporting countries were lower
than internal prices by January or April 1954, by the end of 1954, on the whole, all
export prices were higher than internal prices.
Comparing the export prices of the ECSC, the United States and the United
Kingdom, the executive secretary observed that the only feature common to the export
prices quoted is that for most products they fell between mid-1953 and mid-1954, and
by September 1955, they had risen again to a level generally higher than that of July
1953. United States export prices were determined to be the most stable. The Com-
munity's export prices for bars, sections, shapes and wire rods were generally lower
than those of the United Kingdom and especially the United States. The Community's
prices for most flat products were higher than those of the United States, especially
for the thinner varieties.
123. See text at note 89 supra.
124. See text at note 93 supra.
125. The ECSC Treaty clearly urges minimum intervention by the High Au-
thority and indicates a preference for indirect action. See TEATY arts. 5, 57.
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it is this author's opinion that there is very good reason for the High
Authority to reconsider its stand in the light of the essential realities of
the Community dynamic.
Admittedly, the legal interpretation of the Treaty is not without
difficulty. To begin with, there is no single report or document which
can provide an indication of the "legislative intent" of the negotiators.
This was not an oversight but rather the result of a deliberate decision.
Based on the uniqueness of what was being created, it was decided not
to limit the rule of law to the particular conceptions of the individual
negotiators or the convictions of particular national delegations. How-
ever regrettable this decision not to produce travaux preparatoires,126
it was generally agreed that such a document would inhibit rather than
promote the orderly growth of the Community.
In determining the law of the Community, insofar as relations
between the High Authority and coal and steel enterprises are con-
cerned, primary consideration must be given to the needs of the Com-
munity as elaborated in the text of the Treaty." 7 This is especially true
in those situations where there are no uniform laws of Member States
applicable to the question,2 8 as is the case regarding restrictive trade
practices. In establishing a Community whose regime is based on
competition, clearly a break with the past was envisaged. It was
recognized that coveted notions of protectionism had to be scrapped if
the ambitious objectives of higher productivity could even be approxi-
mated.' The fundamental question posed here is whether the Com-
munity in the light of its own condition can survive, let alone grow in
a dualistic fashion: competitive on the home market and anti-com-
petitive on the export market.
Many authorities 10 insist that it can so operate and that this was
expressly the intention of Robert Schuman, one of the principal pro-
moters of the Treaty. Much attention was given to his remarks before
the National Assembly of France during the ratification debates on the
Treaty.
"But the internal market is not the only one capable of develop-
ment; the exports also can be expanded to the profit of the com-
126. See VALEN NE, THE CouRT oF JusTIcE oF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND S=EEi
CommuNrrY 2 (1954).
127. RxuERs, LA CO mUwAUTk EUROPLENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 202
(1953).
128. Id. at 43.
129. See note 87 and text at note 13 supra.
130. See, e.g., KRAW-mLICxr, DAS MONOPOLVERB0T IM SCHUMAN-PLAN 22 (1952);
RTEBEx 475; BAYER, Das Privatrecht der Montanunion, 1952 ZEITSCHRI FUR
AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT No. 3, at 325, 369 (West Ger-
many); Ophiils, Das Wirtschaftsrecht des Schuman-Plans, 1951 NEUE JURISTIscHE
WOCHENSCnRIFT No. 10, at 381, 382 (West Germany).
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munity, particularly toward the underdeveloped countries. The
producers instead of making an unhealthy competition and quar-
reling for the outside markets can provide and utilize organization
together in exporting in common interest." '
It is largely on the basis of this statement and a so-called "strict reading"
of article 65 of the Treaty that these authorities conclude that the High
Authority is without jurisdiction to combat what is strictly an export
cartel.
Probably the most ambitious attempt to justify the economic neces-
sity and legality of export cartels alongside the Community has been
made by the late Professor Rudolph Isay in a published opinion that he
rendered to the Wirtschafts-Vereinigung Eisen-und Stahlindustrie of
Germany,'32 which deals with the question of whether article 65 133 re-
stricts the liberty of coal and steel enterprises to participate in export
cartels. Professor Isay views article 65, as dealing exclusively with
cartels on the common market and states that this limitation could not
possibly have been an oversight in the light of extensive discussion on
the cartel issue over the past decades. His conviction is that it was
out of the question for the Member States to bring export cartels under
the prohibition of article 65. Crises and cutthroat competition in such
industries as coal and steel, relatively lacking in elastic demand, have
proven ruinous. The social consequences of plant shutdowns and
widespread unemployment could not have been overlooked, he insists.
Although cognizant of the High Authority's powers to regulate pro-
duction and prices in times of crisis, he sweeps these measures aside as
being unequal to the problem of Community survival.3 His straight-
forward conclusion is that whatever the powers of the High Authority,
on the export markets they are simply not adequate substitutes for cartel
agreement and activity. Survival of community enterprise, he con-
cludes, can only be preserved by cartel operations.'35
131. 150 Jou. xA. OFrIcmnr 8,896 (Dec. 7, 1951).
132. Isay, Montamndm und Exportkartelle, 1953 Wm'TsCHApr uxD WE=nEwMW
577-91 (Germany).
133. The relevant portion of TREATY art. 65 provides: "1. All agreements among
enterprises, all decisions of associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices,
tending, directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict or distort the normal operation of
competition within the common market are hereby forbidden, and in particular those
tending: (a) to fix or determine prices; (b) to restrict or control production, technical
.development or investments; (c) to allocate markets, products, customers or sources
of supply."
134. Isay, Montantation und Exportkartelle, in 1953 WiRTscarTA tND WETT-
BEwmE 579-84 (Germany).
135. Id. at 584-89, 591. He concludes also that any national cartel legislation in
the Member States would not apply to export cartels of the coal and steel industries.
See id. at 589-90.
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Abundant interviews in Luxembourg with officials of the High
Authority have convinced the author that Isay's conclusions are not
shared in their entirety.'
36
Pre-emption
Before considering the legality of such arrangements as the Brus-
sels Entente under article 65, other provisions of the Treaty should
first be considered. Upon an examination of articles 5, 58 and 61 it
may be strongly urged that the entire range of production control and
price fixing on both the common and export markets has been pre-
empted by the High Authority and that such conduct by the Brussels
Entente or any other body is contrary to the Treaty.
Article 5 expressly provides for the establishment and maintenance
of competition.17 Production control and price fixing, the antithesis of
competition, are to be employed only when absolutely necessary.'38
For example, production quotas can be instituted by the High Au-
thority under article 58 only upon a showing that a "manifest crisis"
exists and all other means of indirect action have failed.'39 Article 61
provides that prices may be fixed by the High Authority on the export
market only upon a showing that such action is necessary "because
of the dangers to the enterprises resulting from the state of the
market." 140 Clearly, these are extraordinary measures to be employed
only in abnormal times. If the High Authority is not itself controlling
production or fixing prices, it is in effect determining that no crisis
exists that would justify such emergency action. For a private pro-
ducers' group to fix prices or control production in such circumstances is
a departure from the norm of competition when the High Authority
136. Interviews with High Authority officials in Luxembourg, Dec. 3-6, 1956.
For example, Isay insists that in judging the legality of a cartel on the common
market only the declared intention of the contracting parties should be considered
and not the objectively -ineamrrable effects. This result follows, he maintains, from a
strict reading of article 65 of the Treaty. This view has been informally rejected
by the High Authority officials who have considered the question.
137. The relevant portion of TREATY art. 5 provides: "The Community shall
accomplish its mission, under the conditions provided for in this Treaty, with limited
intervention. To this end the Community shall: . . . assure the establishment,
maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of competition, and take direct
action with respect to production and the operation of the market only when cir-
cumstances make it absolutely necessary."
138. Ibid.
139. TREATY art. 58(1) provides: "In case of a decline in demand, if the High
Authority considers that the Community is faced with a period of manifest crisis
and the means of action provided for in Article 57 (indirect means of action) are
not sufficient to cope with this situation, it must, after consulting the Consultative
Committee, establish a system of production quotas .
140. See note 93 supra.
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has determined such extraordinary action unwarranted. Hence such
regulation of export sales is contrary to the Treaty and illegal.
During a time of crisis or when enterprises are in danger the High
Authority itself would control production or fix prices. However,
even upon a finding of a manifest crisis or danger to the enterprises the
High Authority cannot automatically embark upon a restraint of trade.
The Treaty provides in articles 58 and 61 that production control and
price fixing may be established by the High Authority only after a fair
hearing before the Consultative Committee where consumers and
dealers as well as producers would be consulted. 1' Producers'
groups are to be consulted but they are not given any powers of uni-
lateral action. It is inconceivable that such procedural protection is
provided against abusive restraints of trade by a public body and that
none is afforded against identical abuses by a private producers' group
Indeed this conclusion is compelling considering the delicate decisions
that must be made in allocating production quotas, determining the
level of prices to be fixed and when they shall be changed, and the like. 4 '
The responsibility of the High Authority can be enforced by censure and
removal; -" but the Entente seemingly need account to no one for its
decisions.
Thus, the High Authority might have taken the position at the
outset that any export price fixing or production control by the Brus-
sels Entente would be contrary to the Treaty and hence the basis of its
forcible dissolution.
For reasons of its own, the High Authority did not elect to take
such a course. It looked only to article 65 of the Treaty and made
no claim of pre-emption based on a construction of the Treaty as a
whole.
141. See notes 93, 139 supra.
142. The export market is so delicate that any system of regulating it must be
capable of instantaneous adjustment. On this basis, the Consultative Committee
ruled out action by the High Authority in 1953. The High Authority, it was felt,
could not act swiftly enough. Rapport de la Commission Chargie d'Etudier I'Oppor-
tuniM de Fixer des Prix Minima ou Maxima pour Les Produits d'Acier k l'Exporta-
tion vers les Pays Tiers, COMITk CONSULTATIF 3 (Doc. No. 8335f) (1953). Yet
the record of the Brussels Entente during the period of a weakened market is
hardly one of "instantaneous adjustment." Immediately before the meeting between
the Consultative Committee and High Authority on the subject of price-fixing by
the High Authority, it was reported that the prices fixed by the Brussels Entente
were considered too rigid and exporters were ignoring them by undercutting. TMB,
Nov. 27, 1953, p. 13, col. 1. See also CISR 8213 (Jan. 19, 1954) for another example
of price practices of the Brussels Entente.
143. TRFATY art. 24. It may be argued that if articles 58 and 61 are interpreted
to ban cartels, article 65 would have no purpose, and such a view is not to be favored.
An answer to this argument is that article 65 is not thereby rendered useless since
it is not limited to anti-cartel activity but is directed to any joint decision or con-
certed practice that tends to interfere with competition on the common market. Thus,
article 65 would be applicable to prevent two or more enterprises from unreasonably
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Article 65
It is submitted that even under the limitations of article 65,144
sufficient basis exists to take action against the Brussels Entente. Suffi-
cient evidence exists that it tends "directly, or indirectly, to prevent, re-
strict or distort the normal operation of competition within the common
market . . " The routine fixing of minimum export prices by the
Brussels Entente is a matter of widespread public knowledge."4  The
.establishment of production quotas for a trial period of several months
in 1954 was reported in the press 14 and confirmed by an examination of
the secret minutes of the organization. 14 7  The author has no informa-
tion that production quotas are operative at this time, but if they are not
it is only too clear that they will be imposed by the Brussels Entente
as soon as the members can reach agreement upon allocations in the
market slump. 48 For, as the Entente recognized in 1953-1954, without
production controls it is impossible to maintain a fixed minimum price
in a falling market.
The proposition, stated before the Temporary National Economic
Committee Hearings in this country,.49 that restraint of trade by pro-
ducers is a matter of economic necessity, not of malice, is as applicable
to the Brussels Entente as it was applicable to the International Steel
Cartel. While four of the six national steel industries represented in
the Entente are quite interested in export trade, they are not equally
dependent upon such sales. Approximately two-thirds of .the total
steel production of Belgium and Luxembourg is consumed outside their
borders. Almost fifty per cent of their production is exported directly
to countries not members of the Community. In contrast, Germany
restraining trade by: 1) boycotts and refusals to deal, 2) tying clauses, 3) misuse of
patents, 4) decisions to impair quality, 5) restricting investment or interfering with
access to normal sources of commercial finance, etc. In short there are a host of
anti-competitive practices that can be attacked only under article 65 and not under
articles 60 or 61.
144. The material portion of the text of article 65 is set out in note 133 supra.
145. Annex I, para. 1, p. 1114 infra; Annex III, para. 1, p. 1114 infra. See CISR
8176 (Dec. 13, 1953); TMB, April 17, 1953, p. 24, col. 2.
146. See notes 67, 73, 75, 76 supra.
147. See note 71 supra.
148. See text at note 173 infra; Van der Rest, La Sidirurgie europienne dans le
cadre do Plan Schuman, Revue Economique et Sociale, July 1955, pp. 175, 181 (Swit-
zerland). See also STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 106-07 (1948) ;
A CARTEL POLICY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (Edwards ed. 1945) ; LovAsy, INTERNA-
TIONAL CARTELS 1, 13-14 (a League of Nations memorandum published by the Dep't of
Econ. Affairs of the United Nations, 1947).
149. "Of course under the cartels prices were good, otherwise there wouldn't be
any good reason to have a cartel." Testimony of S. M. Bash, Member, Board of
Managers of Steel Export Association of America; Vice-President, Bethlehem Steel
Export Corporation. Hearings, Temporary National Economic Committee of the
Congress, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 20, at 10922, 10962 (1940). See also STOCKING &
WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 97, 135 (1948).
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exports approximately fifteen to twenty per cent of her production
outside the Community and France about the same."' The significance
of this differential became quite apparent on the two occasions when
German steel producers showed signs of defection from Belgian export
designs. At the initiation of the Entente in March 1953, the Germans
participated in the talks but did not join until several months later.' 51
During this lapse of time it was sent home to the Germans that unless
they joined the group they would face severe competition on the Ger-
man home market from the Belgians.52 And again, when the Germans
were detected selling a substantial quantity of steel in violation of the
minimum prices of the Entente, German producers agreed to curtail
their export sales for several months thereafter. This hardly was an
act of philanthropy. The clue to this retirement from the export
market is contained in an account in a Belgian newspaper Le Soir de-
scribing the discussions. Terming the German sales "dumping" it
stated:
"The German producers will retire from the export market until
the end of March. The threats by the Belgian industrialists to
compete-at unbeatable prices-on the German home market have
therefore not been without their effect." '-3
Such an artificial division of markets and allocation of customers is ex-
pressly forbidden by article 65 (1) (c) of the Treaty. Thus, notwith-
standing extreme caution on the part of the High Authority, it seems
that a prompt investigation of these reports should have been made
several years ago. Unfortunately this was not done, and nothing has
been done since. An inquiry first planned in 1953 to determine how
prices are formed on the common market has never been undertaken,
let alone completed. The last indication of why it had stalled was that
such an inquiry might prejudice the chances of a European Defense
Community being formed."' With the demise of that plan in 1954 15
it seems that such an excuse for delay is somewhat outdated. Yet, even
150. For years 1952, 1953, 1954, see HIGH AUTHORITY, THIRD GENERAl. REPORT
ON THE AcTVIEs OF THE COMMUNITY Tables 14-19 (1955). For 1955 and 1956
production and marketing statistics, see HAUTE AuTORIT-, ANNEXES AU CINQUIkME
RAppoRT GiNRAL sui i.'Acr=I E LA CommuxAuTA Tables 5, 14, 18 (1957).
151. See TMB, April 17, 1953, p. 24, col. 2; Interviews in Brussels, March 19-20,
1957. See also Evely, Cartels and the Coal-Steel Community, 4 CARTEL 82, 88
(1954).
152. See TMB, April 3, 1953, p. 29, col. 1; The Price of Steel, 157 THE STATIST
770 (1953).
153. Le Soir (Brussels), Feb. 26, 1954, p. 9, col. 7.
154. Interview in Luxembourg, March 27, 1957.
155. For an insight into the role of the European Defense Community in rela-
tion to the ECSC see MAsoN, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 134-37
(1955).
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in the absence of data produced by such a study it is no secret that
prices on the common market are fixed by agreement and consultation
between producers and not competitively." 6 It is fanciful to expect pro-
ducers who actively cooperate in fixing prices on the export market to
forget all they have learned when they deal with the common market. 5
Another direct effect of the Brussels Entente on the common
market is the restraint of trade that results from the engagement of the
producers to boycott any independent dealer who, even though not a
member of the Entente, violates its prices or policies. The promise by
the producers is cast in terms of abstaining from "any future trans-
actions" '~s with such intransigents and is not limited merely to new
export sales. Thus, independent dealers who assert their independence
can be closed out of sales on the common market for their non-
conformist conduct on the export market. Interviews by the author
with merchants have confirmed this suspicion."
To the author, perhaps the most compelling reason for the High
Authority to strike down such groups as the Brussels Entente is their
necessarily restrictive effect on the common market. Expanded pro-
duction and increased productivity are the primary channels through
which reduced costs and rational distribution are to be achieved in
Community enterprise. It has been conclusively shown that even where
producers' groups do not deliberately pursue a policy of creating scar-
156. The High Authority has already remarked on the amazing uniformity of
prices of steel producers on the common market. See text at note 91 mipra. For
subsequent comments on price fixing and price rigidity on the common market, see
CISR 9461 (Oct. 6, 1956) and CISR 9506 (Nov. 7, 1956). The role of the govern-
ments in this rigidity should not be ignored. Ibid.
Conceding that the European steel industry is possibly now more competitive
than at any time since the early 1920's and that few steel industries anywhere show
much price competition, a recent economic study concludes that there is little to
suggest that the price behavior of steel in the ECSC is competitive. Root, The
European Coal and Steel Community, Univ. of Md. Studies in Bus. and Econ.,
June 1956, No. 1, pt. 2, p. 10.
157. Testimony of H. W. Schroeder, District Sales Manager, New York office,
Wheeling Steel Corporation and company representative to the Steel Export Associa-
tion of America, affirmed that American participation in the pre-war International
Steel Cartel would have some effect or a possible effect on the American domestic
steel market. When asked how it was possible for him to have this knowledge and
yet negotiate with the steel cartel, he responded, "I can keep it, let's say, hidden in
my mind." Hearings, Temporary National Economic Committee of the Congress,
76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 20, at 10979 (1940). Notwithstnding Mr. Schroeder's
rather fascinating mental agility, the following conclusion seems more plausible:
"[P]roducers who have learned to cooperate in regulating their foreign sales, and
have found a means of making their joint program effective are not likely to forget
what they have learned when doing business on the home market." STOCKING &
WATKINS, CARTELS OR COaPETITION 259 (1948). See International Cartels and
Private Trade Agreements, in INSTITUTE ON POSTwAR RECONSTRUCTION, AERmCA'S
PLACE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 118 (New York Univ. Ser. IV, No. 5, 1944).
158. Annex IV, para. 1, p. 1115 infra.
159. Interviews in Dusseldorf, May 14, 1957; in Brussels, March 20, 1957; and
in Rotterdam, March 11, 1957. See Annex V, p. 1116 infra.
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city, or seek in advance to fix global supplies, being exclusively con-
cerned with price fixing and not quantitative quotas, the practice of
prohibiting acceptance of orders below a minimum price, or long-term
contracts, has in itself acted as a curb on quantities supplied to the
market.' Thus, any development on the export market which re-
stricts the expansion of production necessarily affects the common
market because it prevents the reduction in costs and prices that
would otherwise result. The relationship between the export and
common markets of the Community is so intimate as to make of them
almost a single economic entity.
It is of great significance that the Entente controls a greater volume
of international steel trade than does the High Authority. While each
Annual Report of the High Authority stresses the increased inter-
penetration of Community products on the common market, the ultimate
fact remains that in every year since the creation of the Community
more Community steel has been traded outside the Community than
across the frontiers of the Member States.""' Whatever success the
High Authority has had in eliminating discriminatory transport rates
and prices, state subsidies, tariffs and quantitative restrictions, 0 2 the
fact is that more international steel traffic is subject to the restraints of
the Brussels Entente than has been emancipated by the High Au-
thority." Considering these facts it is hard to conceive how the
Brussels Entente can fail to affect the common market, directly or in-
directly, in every decision it makes. If the fundamental objectives of
the Community that are pinned on expansion, efficiency and competition
are to be fulfilled, the High Authority cannot ignore the challenge of
the Brussels Entente indefinitely. Article 65 provides ample authority
for effective action.
CONCLUSION
Quite naturally, countries outside the Community have been most
concerned about the activity of the Brussels Steel Export Entente.
Particularly those consumers especially dependent upon Community
160. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELs 78 (1945).
161. See HIGH AUTHORITY, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACrMTIES OF THE
COMMUNITY 59 (1956).
162. There is no question that the success of the High Authority in eliminating
artificial barriers to trade has been responsible for producing a substantial degree of
steel price stability, a major change in European steel marketing. See U.N. EcoNomic
CoMmissIoN EURoPE, THE EUROPEAN STEEL Mmnur~ IN 1954, 51 (1955); U.N.
ECONOMIC CommissIoN EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN STEEL MAR=ET IN 1955 55 (1956).
163. In 1956, for example, 8.9 million metric tons of steel were exported subject
to the rules of the Brussels Entente. Only 5.1 million metric tons of steel were traded
between the Member States. In 1957 and throughout 1958, steel exports, consisting
mostly of finished products, substantially exceeded intra-community steel trade, which
includes large quantities of scrap and pig iron.
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steel supplies have been apprehensive of the development of a new steel
cartel within the ECSC. It has been suggested that one of the principal
reasons for the formation of the Entente was the determination of
Community steel producers to counteract the effects of the development
of substantial steel production centers in so-called underdeveloped areas
of the world, e.g., Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin Amer-
ica.' It is submitted that if anything will inject a note of desperation
into such developments it is the activity of such a conspiracy as the
Brussels Entente.
To date, these "third countries" have contributed substantially to
the expansion of Community production, trade and fortune.' Fears
that Community steel would be displaced have not proven true. On
the contrary, experience to date has shown that industrialization in
these areas has increased, not reduced, the flow of Community steel
there.16 In this regard, Latin America offers a cardinal example.
Even though Latin American steel production has quadrupled in the
decade since World War II, steel import requirements have not
diminished. Despite the production of steel for the first time in Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, Latin American demand has risen
faster than can be met by local supply owing to the vigorous industrial
development programs. 1 7
So long as there remains the prospect of an uninterrupted supply of
steel at competitive prices, there is no reason to believe that this type
of market expansion will not continue for European steel. However,
so long as the Community tolerates such relics of a bygone era as the
Brussels Entente, consumers in third countries can never place un-
qualified confidence in the Community. They will be forced to press
for local steel production that will eliminate any dependency on ECSC
steel.
164. See note 37 supra.
165. See note 161 mtpra.
166. "Technological progress is beyond doubt the best friend of the iron and steel
industry. The future holds out years, if not decades of prosperity for the iron and
steel industry. This is now recognized the world over." CISR 9562 (Dec. 19,
1956).
167. While the percentage share of consumption provided by imports has fallen
steadily as local production has increased, from 917 in 1935-39 to 64% during
1950-54, the absolute level of steel imports has grown from 1.9 million metric tons
during 1935-39 to approximately 2.85 million tons in 1950-54. Of all steel imported
into Latin America, Community steel producers supply approximately one-half.
CISR 1-2 (special ed., Jan. 10, 1957). Southeast Asia as represented by India offers
a parallel example. Notwithstanding increased domestic production in 1956 of 1.33
million metric tons, India imported more than 1.6 million tons of steel (CISR 9592
(Jan. 21, 1957)) and was Great Britain's second best customer for tubes, pipes
and fittings that year, following Canada by a scant thousand tons. CISR 9608
(Jan. 31, 1957).
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Yet as important as Community export policy-or the lack of one
-is for third countries, it is probably even more critical for the Com-
munity itself. Already the Community has recognized that the cartel
problem is one of the most important with which it must deal. 6 '
Many reliable authorities have underscored the importance of the ex-
port market for the Community. The Economic Commission for
Europe is already on record as criticising export price policies of the
steel producers." 9 By fixing prices, prohibiting long-term contracts
and enforcing dealer boycotts, the Brussels Entente can hardly com-
mend itself for any expansion of trade.1"' Indeed any increase in trade
has undoubtedly occurred in spite of rather than because of the Entente.
In addition there is good reason to believe that the Entente has already
threatened the fundamental objectives of the Community by its effects
on the common market, not the least of which has been the result of in-
terfering with genuine price competition.'" Men who plot against
competition on the export market can hardly be expected to boost it on
the common market.
If tonnage quotas for the members of the Entente are not in ef-
fect now, it is hardly fanciful to anticipate their reimposition when the
market weakens to the extent that it did in 1953-1954.172 Indeed, this
has been made clear by M. Pierre Ricard, late President of the French
Iron and Steel Federation, when he stated:
"'[P] rice agreements have rarely succeeded, for fraudulent prac-
tices are difficult to detect because the customer benefits from the
favorable price and, therefore, will not disclose it. The only
agreements that matter are those which also concern tonnage.
Such an agreement is very desirable .... ' "'n
168. HGH AUTHoRITy, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET FOR
STEEL 50 (May 1953).
169. In U.N. EcoNoiuc CoMMIssIoN EUROPE, THE STEEL MARKcET IN 1953
72 (1954), it is stated: "[T]he European steel industry has probably to a certain
extent stimulated the growth of steel production overseas by following a short-
sighted policy of charging what the market will bear in times of high demand."
This statement was strongly objected to by the Belgian steel industry in the ad-
dendum to this report. U.N. Doc. Nos. E/ECE/183/Add. 1, E/ECE/STEEL/79/
Add. 1, at 5-6 (1954). But see U.N. EcoNoMIc COMMIsSIoN EUROPE, EUROPEAN
STEEL EXPORTS AND STEEL DEMAND IN NoN-EUROPEAN COUNTRIEs 44-45, 71-72
(1953).
170. See HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 79 (1945); STOCKING & WATKINS,
CARTELS OR CoMpmnTION 99, 109, 117 (1948).
171. As has been pointed out by STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION
110 (1954), cartel operation rarely tends to reduce costs. The Brussels Entente is no
exception. The Entente's standard operating procedure is to fix its minimum price
in alignment with the highest price obtaining on the common market for the particular
product. Interview in Brussels, March 19, 1957. This can only subsidize the high-
cost producers and defeat any genuine interest in cost reduction.
172. See note 148 mtpra.
173. Reported in Evely, Cartels and the Coal-Steel Community, 4 CAmRTEL 82,
89 (1954).
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It is the author's opinion that an export entente can survive scru-
tiny under the Treaty only when it demonstrates that it does not re-
strain competition on the common market, even indirectly. Because
of the interdependence of the common and export market to such a de-
gree that the development of the common market is inextricably linked
to the development of exports,' 74 any group fostering agreements, de-
cisions and practices in restraint of steel trade should have the burden
of disproving that they affect the common market, directly or in-
directly.'7 In all likelihood it is only a group that represents no more
than a trade association ruling by consent rather than by coercion that
will be able to meet such a burden. Provisions in agreements pro-
viding for pecuniary penalties for underquoting the group's minimum
prices or conditions of sale would be invalid since such penalties would
necessarily increase the production costs of the members fined. Such
increased costs would adversely affect the member's ability to compete
on the common market. For the same reason any levies or assessments
for the group's "fighting fund" against competitors in certain overseas
markets would be prohibited."" Clearly any imposition of production
controls even when designed to apply only to export sales, cannot but
affect the common market. Finally, any provisions interfering with
freedom of sale by independent exporters, such as boycotts and refusals
to deal, would be invalid since distribution control is substantially
equivalent in effect to production control. Thus, it would seem that
there is an adequate legal basis to take action against the Brussels
Entente. As indicated above,177 either from a construction of the entire
purpose of the Treaty, especially articles 5, 58 and 61, or under article
65, the High Authority might strike down the Entente as prohibited
activity.
It is one thing, however, to insist that the Brussels Entente may be
struck down as an illegal combination in restraint of trade. It is quite
another matter to determine the propriety, manner and timing of such
a course. In the first instance, there are many responsible persons who
insist that in its present form the Entente is a weak and ineffective
organization, hardly able to operate in a crisis, and will die of its own
defects unless galvanized into strength by an ill-advised assault upon
it.' 78  Others will point out that to date the Entente has pursued a
moderate price policy, particularly in comparison with the Korean
174. RIEBEN 473, 481.
175. Gleiss, Stahlexportkartell und Eisenpreis, 1954 AUSSENHANDELSDIENST DER
INDusTRIE UND HANDELSKAMMERN UND WIRT$CHAFTSVERBXNDE (Cologne).
176. Gleiss, Mandmunion und Stahlexportkartell, 1954 Dma BE PJBs-BERMAA
965 (Heidelberg).
177. See text at notes 137, 144 supra.
178. Numerous interviews in The Hague, Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris, 1956-57.
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"boom" period and should not be attacked until it is shown that it is
impressing inequitable prices on the export markets 7 9 Answers to
these contentions have been ably provided, however, in Irwin Hexner's
study of international cartels.' In this work he indicates that the ideal
entente would have no written regulations at all. A large formal or-
ganization is hardly necessary in his opinion. As for the present
"weakness" of the Entente, it need only be recalled that Ententes and
cartels are not always born fully matured. The shortcomings of the
1926 version of the International Steel Cartel were not beyond remedy
in 1933.81 So that the present "moderate" price policy of the Brussels
Entente does not become a fixed basis for future faith, it should be
recalled that at one time even the International Steel Cartel ad-
monished its members not to charge "high" prices.' 82
In any event, it is only too clear that there will be a deep-seated
resistance to any forcible attempt to dissolve the Entente. The proceed-
ings of the meetings of the Consultative Committee and the Council
of Ministers amply demonstrate this."s Moreover, there are many
industrialists who have never been sympathetic to the antitrust policy
contained in the Treaty. Thus, it is argued that to force the issue
against the Entente too rapidly could result. in a frontal attack upon
the entire antitrust policy of the Community. To avoid such a show-
down, it is urged that the High Authority should continue to strengthen
the common market, to build a sound investment foundation and pursue
its task of "education" as it progresses. Undeniably there is much
merit to such a view. Admittedly, the United States had an antitrust
statute twenty years before it had an effective antitrust policy."s Devel-
oping such a basic policy in the Community, where there has been no
genuine competition in the steel industry for as long as thirty years,
cannot come about in the span of a few short years.
Still, the threat of the Brussels Entente cannot be put off in-
definitely. If the United States was allowed "twenty years of grace"
after the Sherman Act was enacted, the Community has been denied
this period of accommodation by the accelerating rate of technological
advance since 1890, and by the political implications of the phenomenal
179. See remarks of the High Authority observer to the GATT in text at
note 117 stpra.
180. HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELs 64 (1945).
181. See schematic analysis and chronology of the International Steel Cartel in
LovAsY, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS Table 2 (a League of Nations memorandum pub-
lished by the Dep't of Econ. Affairs of the United Nations, 1947).
182. HEXNER, THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL 179 (1943).
183. See text at notes 98, 108 supra.
184. Early enforcement of the Sherman Act was, at best, unsystematic. See
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGIN OF AN AMECAN TRADITION
(1955).
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productive expansion of the Soviet Union and her satellites. 8 5 In
addition, there is the fact that whenever steel producers have been
allowed to fix their own market policies without Community interven-
tion, they have unhesitatingly fallen back onto the cartel mold. The
tube sector offers the clearest example of this. Tube production and
trade, not being subject to the regulation of the Treaty, has reverted
to the pre-war form of organization of the International Steel Cartel.
After several attempts during 1948-53, the tube cartel was founded in
1955 to fix tonnage and regulate prices in the manner in practice before
the war except that domestic sales were not included. Efforts to expand
the cartel have been recently reported. 8 6
The significance of such developments is simply this. Already,
the Community is being confronted with a series of concrete examples
of a determined return by steel producers to policies of restriction. If
the Community fails to exercise its authority where it may do so under
the Treaty, it can only yield the initiative to such forces. Only by
reasonably prompt and courageous action can it put down the carteliza-
tion that is growing up wherever it is not challenged. It is not enough
merely to note that there is no proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the minimum prices of the Brussels Entente are "inequitable." The
difficulties involved in determining the actual prices charged for steel
commodities on the export market is not a new problem.8 7  The sub-
stantial contributions that the Community has made and is making to
provide an effective alternative to the cartelization of steel production
and trade are certainly not to be denied or deprecated. But all the same
it would seem fair to urge the Community, particularly the High Au-
thority, to reassess its position regarding the propriety of such groups
as the Brussels Entente and take vigorous action to dissolve them. As
has been said, free competitive trade at home and cartels abroad make
a poor combination. Both patterns being dynamic, there is no simple
way to determine which will triumph. Policies toward export trade
185. In 1956 the Soviet Union and her satellites accounted for approximately
22.6% of world steel production, as against 20.1% for the ECSC, 7.4% for the United
Kingdom and 36.9% for the United States. HAUTE AUTORIT, ANNEXES AU
CINQuIkmE RAPPORT GtNtRAL SUR L'ACTIVITE LA ComuNAUTt Table 9 (1957).
186. The cartel's scope includes commercial steel tubes up to a diameter of six
inches. Effective until 1960, the tube agreement provides that of the total export
allotment of approximately 1.6 million tons, German producers will account for 41%,
British 33%, French and Belgian approximately 26%. Special attempts to include
the Netherlands and Italy have been noted. See CISR 9590-91 (Jan. 21, 1957).
And this is not the only cartel where iron and steel producers and fabricators have
been active. Periodically there have been reports concerning such groups as a wire
and nail entente (CISR 9127, 9156 (Jan. 21, Feb. 11, 1956)) ; a railroad car manu-
facturers entente (CISR 8702-03 (Feb. 22, 1955)) ; and a producer's agreement re-
garding galvanized sheets (CISR 9173 (Feb. 21, 1956)), 8776 (April 8, 1955).
187. See HEXNER, THE INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL 188-89 (1943).
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and commerce have a direct bearing upon competition and the pattern
of industrial organization on the internal market.1
8
Certainly the High Authority must be aware of this. As the
author best understands its official attitude, it is simply that the High
Authority prefers an educational to an authoritarian approach. If any-
thing, the High Authority is self-conscious. It recognizes the historical
significance of its existence and is reluctant to damage the potential for
European unification that it represents.'8 9 Rather than claim an ex-
pansive area of operations it has elected to pursue a more modest role.
By operating well in this fashion it feels that a greater measure of public
confidence and support for the community idea will be generated. 90
Until this practice proves unworkable, the High Authority will pursue
its goals by conciliation and persuasion. It will concentrate on per-
fecting the common market and by its success hopes to be able to demon-
strate the inherent good sense of competitive enterprise for export sales
as well. The question that remains is whether the ECSC can afford
the luxury of time that such "education" demands.
To make the most of an expanding world demand, the Community
must lead, not merely keep pace with, her foreign competitions in in-
ventiveness, efficiency and enterprise. It is submitted that this result
is more likely if the individual producers and dealers are able to operate
freely in accordance with their own judgment and insight. The system
that the Brussels Entente imposes can only serve to weaken incentive
to reduce costs and expand trade. By its price policies it tends to
create a structure of rigidity in a day when resiliency and initiative are
demanded. The great opportunities which lie ahead for the steel pro-
ducers of the Community have served to focus the attention of the whole
world on the effectiveness of Europe's "first antitrust law."
Undoubtedly the community has the power to assert itself against
producer hegemony. However, the longer it continues to tolerate the
companionship of the steel export entente, the greater are the dangers
that this power will atrophy. The prospect of such a result looms
disturbingly before all those who share and applaud the Community's
goals and aspirations.
188. STOCUNG & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION 414 (1948). See also
BERGE, CARTELS: A CHALLENGE TO THE FREI WORLD 2 (1944) ; A CARTEL. PoLIcy
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 88 (Edwards ed. 1945).
189. It has been said that the role of the ECSC in European integration is a
matter of critical urgency: "Either the [Schuman] Plan is to be regarded as a step
toward European federation or as a series of technical arrangements of little out-
standing importance." THORP, TRADE, AID OR WHAT? 86 (1954). This same theme
is developed in RACiNE, VERs UNE EUROPE NOUVELLE PAR LE PLAN SCHUMAN pas.sim
(1954).
190. The role that the operation of the ECSC and ECSC personnel played in the
development of Euratom and the General Common Market is a matter of widespread
public knowledge. See Bulletin, Jan., Feb.-March, April-May, June-July 1957, Nos.
21, 22, 23, 24.
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ANNEX I.** BRUSSELS ENTENTE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 19, 1953
In conclusion of negotiations which have taken place between the 9th and the 18th
of March, 1953 for the purpose of examining, in common, the situation on the export
markets of countries other than those of the Community and their overseas territories,
the representatives of the steel industries of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg have
agreed to adopt the following arrangements, effective immediately:
1. Immediate establishment of a commission, composed of two members per coun-
try, duly authorized by the body of producers of their respective countries, to be
charged with the task of analyzing present conditions on the export markets and to
determine, consequently, minimum prices, conditions of payment, commissions, etc.,
that the producers promise to respect. This commission will also be charged with
the responsibility of following the market developments.
2. In order to aid the above-mentioned body in its mission, a permanent bureau
will be created in Brussels to which the central bureaus of the three interested steel
industries will regularly address, every three days, the details of orders received by
the works of the group or on their account, together with an indication of the tonnages,
products, destinations, price and conditions of sale applicable to their clientele.
3. The permanent bureau may order, in case of violations of conditions fixed in
conformity with paragraph 1. above, investigations to be carried out by the national
boards of the interested steel associations. The results of these investigations will be
communicated to the commission which may formulate in regard to such infringements
any remonstrances or recommendations that it deems necessary.
4. The commission will have the mission to search for formulas capable of leading
to more precise and more complete agreements concerning the export markets as
defined under paragraph 1. and present, to this effect, its conclusions for a period to
be determined according -to the circumstances.
5. This arrangement, concluded for an indefinite duration, will take effect begin-
ning the 20th of March, 1953; it may be renounced by one of the participating groups
from the 1st of June by means of notice given seven days in advance.
6. The agreement thus concluded applies to the following products: semi-finished
products, merchant baro, I and U sections, wide flange beams, hoops and tube strip,
wire rod, heavy plates, medium and wide plates, hot and cold rolled sheets (less than
3 mm.). Finished carbon steels and special steels are excluded.
7. The producers of Germany, Holland and Italy are invited, from this time, to
join this arrangement.
[Dated] March 19, 1953.
ANNEX II. INDIVIDUAL PRODUCERS ADHERENcE To MAsTER AGREEMENT
oF MARCH 19, 1953
The undersigned company engages by these presents, to Mr.
President of to respect in its export sales of semi-
finished products, and finished products defined in the convention, conditions of price,
surcharges and other conditions as agreed upon in Paris on the 18th day of March,
1953.
The company agrees to submit to all control measures and verification that may
be decided upon in order to assure the effective execution of the agreements made.
Done this day of
ANNEX III. AGREEMENT ON EXPORT PRICES PROTOCOL
The representatives of the German, Belgian, French, Dutch and Luxembourg steel
industries meeting together in Luxembourg on Monday, the 7th of September, 1953
have agreed to maintain and consolidate the general agreement on export prices for
those countries other than those of the Community and their overseas territories
concluded since the end of the month of March 1953 on the basis of the protocol
dated the 19th of that month.
To this end, they have agreed on the following means of application:
1. The Commercial Commission, instituted pursuant to paragraph 1. of the
protocol of the 19th of March, 1953 and composed of two members per country, duly
authorized by the body of works of their respective countries, will continue to coordi-
** The text of all annexes was translated from the French by the author.
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nate the policy of export sales of works participating in this agreement. For this,
it will be concerned particularly with analyzing the conditions on the export markets
and determining, consequently, the minimum prices, conditions of payment, com-
missions, extras, etc., that the works promise to respect. It will be equally concerned
with following the market developments, taking account of the competition from
similar works in third countries with which they compete.
2. The Common Permanent Bureau created in Brussels pursuant to paragraph 2.
of the above-mentioned protocol of the 19th of March, will continue as before its
mission of centralization and statistical services. The central offices of the five inter-
ested steel industries will regularly notify it, every five days, of the details of business
received by the works of the group or for their account with an indication of tonnages,
products, destination, price and conditions of sale applied to the customers.
3. A Commission composed of independent persons and designated by common
agreement will be in charge of investigations, as a control organ, of quotations or
business received which is made the subject of a complaint.
4. This agreement will be applied by means of assurances and guarantees of the
subscribed promise of the Director General [of the works] or by the representatives
duly authorized from each of the associations of participating countries; the text
of this engagement, establishment by common agreement, is attached. [See Annex IV.]
5. The Commercial Commission will also have the responsibility of searching for
formulas that will lead to a more precise and more complete agreement regarding
the export markets as defined above and submit propositions to this effect to the
Committee of Presidents set for the 31st of October, 1953.
6. The present agreement is applicable to the following products: semi-finished
products, merchant baro, I and U sections, and broad flange beams, light weight ma-
terials, hoop and tube strip, wire rod, heavy plates, medium and wide plates, hot and
cold rolled sheets (less than 3 mm.). Finished carbon steels and special steels are
excluded.
7. This agreement which is concluded for an indefinite duration, cannot be re-
nounced by any of the participating associations before the first of July, 1954 and then
only after the seven days prior notice provided by the initial agreement.
Luxembourg, 7th of September, 1953.
AN x IV. Expokr Paica Aa Z T ENGAGEMENT
We the undersigned . . . duly authorized by the . . . company hereby promise
on our honor to the Direction Committee, composed of the five Presidents to conform
to the obligations resulting from the export agreement concerning countries other
than those of the Community and their overseas territories as it has been confirmed
by the German, Belgian, French, Dutch and Luxembourg groups according to the
protocol of the 7th of September, 1953 and particularly to respect for each destination
the minimum prices and extras and other sales requirements including conditions of
payment, strictly defined by the Commission charged with the application of this
agreement.
The engagement involves on our part the obligation:
1. To take all care to assure the respect of these minimum prices and extras and
other sales requirements and conditions of payment by all agents, representatives and
sales organizations of our company as well as by the merchants and agents on com-
mission handling our products on the market; these dispositions particularly require,
in conformance to the decisions already taken by the Commercial Commission, the
continued prohibition of concluding, or making or letting be concluded on behalf of
our firm, any transaction in the form of a contract whose terms are to be applied for
a period longer than that prescribed.
These dispositions also require the prohibition of representatives and merchants
abandoning or ceding to purchasers all or part of their commissions. Our company
promises to impose on them the respect for this prohibition and to assume the responsi-
bility for its enforcement In the case of an infraction committed by a merchant, we
promise collectively with all the works participating in the convention to boycott said
merchant in any future transactions.
2. To produce, or cause to be produced, upon first request all justifications and
all original documents in the possessoin of our firm or our agents, representatives,
sales organizations, or merchants mentioned in paragraph 1., for the investigation or
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control of transactions involving steel delivered or to be delivered by our firm and
for which there might exist a presumption of an infraction. The refusal to produce
these justifications and documents will be considered as proof of the infraction and
will lead to the application of sanctions listed in paragraph 4. below.
3. To comply wih the requests and instructions of the neutral control bureau
relative to its operations in investigation and control, in conformity with paragraph 3.
of the protocol of the 7th of September, 1953. This control organ will have all access,
that it judges necessary, to the various offices of our firm in order to conduct any
investigations that prove necessary.
4. To execute the decisions and sanctions ordered by the Committee of Presidents
by simple majority on the report of the Commission established by virtue of para-
graph 3. of the protocol and to pay the penalties which may be imposed up to the
equivalent of fifty dollars U.S.A. per ton sold in violation of the agreement.
5. The means of payment, possible penalties, as well as their appropriation will
be fixed by the Committee of Presidents.
6. These engagements contained in these presents take effect from the 8th of
September, 1953.
[Dated] September 8, 1953.
ANNEX V. TYPICAL CoNDrrIoN OF SALE IMPOSED ON INDEPENDENT MERCHANT
By M m a OF BRUSSELS EmTNT
Gentlemen:
We have reserved the matter made the object of our confirmation of sale and
annexed hereto regarding the provision of tons of steel
destined ultimately to on commission of , ,
which will be calculated on the net amount of the F.O.B. value of the merchandise.
You are obligated in return:
1. To respect and cause to be respected by the purchasers the destination above
indicated;
2. To take all measures to assure that your firm, your agents, and any inter-
mediaries that may be placed between you and the final destination, respect minimum
prices (CIF), extras, and other sales requirements including conditions of payment
indicated by us. These obligations contain equally the prohibition against you your-
self, your agents and brokers who purchase from you, abandoning or ceding to pur-
chasers, directly or indirectly, all or part of the commission that you are accorded
by us, all or part of the commission that you allow your agents or brokers.
The same prohibition applies against any abandonment or any cession to pu-"
chasers of all or part of the difference that may exist from your profit between the
freight rate included in the CIF price indicated and the actual freight rate.
3. To produce, at our demand, in case of a presumption of an infraction, all
justifications and all original documents in the possession of your firm or of your
agents. The refusal to produce these justifications and documents will be considered
as proof of an infraction.
The fact that we take or we transmit the order implicates your acceptances,
without reservation, of the conditions enumerated above.
Please be assured, gentlemen, of our distinguished greetings .
